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THE FUTURE OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS AGAINST
FOREIGN COMPANIES: CHINA AND COMITY CONCERNS
Dana M. Muir,* Junhai Liu,** and Haiyan Xu***
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the U.S. Supreme Court limited
the application of U.S. securities fraud law in transnational situations. The Su-
preme Court noted that its decision was influenced by international comity
considerations. In this Article, we evaluate the availability of class actions in
China in cases involving alleged securities fraud. Because we find that the availa-
bility of those actions is too limited to fully protect U.S. shareholders, we argue that
U.S. investors should be permitted to bring securities fraud class actions against
non-U.S. companies whose securities are traded on a U.S. exchange regardless of
where those investors entered into the relevant securities transactions.
INTRODUCTION
Securities law is one of the many settings where the intersection
of substantive federal law and the standards and policies underlying
class actions has given rise to a rich and deep scholarly literature.'
The issues have also recently drawn the attention of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, with the Court accepting class action securities law
cases in each of the most recent three terms. 2 Globalization of the
financial markets brings a third complicating factor to securities
fraud class actions. The constellation of class actions, securities law,
and transnational factors has come together as securities fraud by
Chinese companies has garnered the attention of the mainstream
media, scholars, and policymakers.
* Arthur F. Thurnau Professor of Business Law, Stephen M. Ross School of Business,
University of Michigan. The authors thank Michael Muthleb for excellent research assistance
and the Michigan Ross School of Business for research support. For purposes of uniformity,
throughout this article we give surnames last.
** Professor of Law, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China.
*** Professor of Law, University of International Business & Economics, Beijing, China.
1. See, e.g., Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 802, 803-06; John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An
Essay on Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1534, 1534-36 (2006).
2. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S.Ct. 1184 (2013); Erica P. John
Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011); Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130
S. Ct. 2869 (2010). See infra note 19 for a brief discussion of the Amgen and Erica P. John Fund
decisions.
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This Article focuses on the effects of the U.S. Supreme Court's
2010 decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., which up-
set decades of lower court jurisprudence by holding that the basic
U.S. securities anti-fraud provision reaches a narrower set of class
actions involving transnational factors than had been permitted by
the lower courts.3 Although the decision is limited to the applica-
tion of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19344 ('34
Act) and its accompanying Rule 10b-5,5 it is situated within the set
of recent Supreme Court decisions evidencing skepticism of class
actions.6 Congress acted within days of the Morrison decision to ex-
tend the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) powers to
bring securities fraud lawsuits involving transnational companies.
However, scholars, securities industry participants, and policy mak-
ers are divided over the appropriate scope of private rights of
action. At one end of the spectrum, Professor Merritt Fox argues
that private rights of action should not be available against a non-
U.S. company even if the company is traded on a U.S. exchange
unless the company explicitly chooses to be subject to those suits as
a bonding mechanism. 7 At the opposite end of the spectrum of po-
tential approaches, a number of institutional investors and others
have advocated a return to the standard developed by the lower
courts, which permitted a wide range of securities fraud class ac-
tions against foreign companies.
8
This Article is unique in using China's securities law and class
action procedures as a lens through which to consider using class
actions in transnational securities fraud cases. This is consistent
with the Supreme Court's stated concern with international comity,
which it voiced in Morrison and led it to circumscribe the reach of
Section 10(b). China is particularly important for those interested
3. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878, 2888 (2010).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). Unless otherwise stated, for purposes of this Article,
references to Section 10(b) include Rule 1Ob-5.
6. See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, Punitive Damages and Class Actions, 70 LA. L. REv. 435,
437 (2010) ("[T] he Supreme Court has been extremely skeptical of class actions in personal
injury cases."); Alexandra N. Rothman, Note, Bringing an End to the Trend: Cutting Judicial
"Approval" and "Rejection" Out of Non-Class Mass Settlement, 80 FORDHAM. L. REv. 319, 323-24
(2011) (noting recent Supreme Court jurisprudence reflects restraint in use of class actions).
7. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1173,
1176 (2012) (referring to Section 10(b) securities law class actions alleging trading losses in
the secondary markets as "[firaud-on-the-market" causes of action).
8. See SEC. & Exc-. COMM'N, STUDY ON THE CROSS-BORDER SCOPE OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT
OF ACTiON UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE SECURmTs ExCHANGE ACT OF 1934, 49 & n.179,
50-55 (2012) [hereinafter SEC STUDY], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/
929y-study-cross-border-private-rights.pdf.
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in considering the effects of U.S. securities class action law on for-
eign companies, investors, and markets. As noted above, securities
fraud by Chinese companies has been widely reported in the last
few years. Meanwhile, China's influence on the global economy9
vastly exceeds the relatively limited attention it has received in U.S.
securities and class action literature. China's economy, securities
markets, regulation, and approach to class actions have all devel-
oped rapidly over the past decade, and every indication is that will
continue.
Thus, this Article focuses on the limited question of how China's
securities regulation, and particularly its attitudes to securities law
class actions, should influence the extent to which U.S. investors
may bring securities law class actions under Section 10(b) of the '34
Act. The article begins with a discussion of the current legal land-
scape in the United States and in China. Part I focuses on the
United States. It will explain the basic framework of class actions
alleging federal securities fraud and highlight the current debates
over the effectiveness of those actions. Part I also examines the im-
port of the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison for securities
fraud class actions and briefly evaluates reactions by scholars and
policy makers. Part II turns to securities fraud regulation in China.
That section considers the extent to which law in China limits the
ability of investors injured by misrepresentations to bring class ac-
tions. As with other countries, China's provisions for multiple-party
litigation differ significantly from U.S. class actions. As is typical in
comparative articles, 0 this Article will refer to China's multiple-
party litigation as class actions unless it is discussing a specific provi-
sion of China's law or a precise reference is useful for clarity. The
section ends with a discussion of the 2012 class action reform in
China.
In Part III, the Article analyzes the barriers to class actions in
China and shows how those barriers are comparatively both much
higher than in the United States and more significant than a facial
comparison of the statutory regimes would indicate. It then dis-
cusses the implications of 2012 reform in China for that
comparative analysis. Part IV opens by presenting two suggested
9. See, e.g., Zhijun Sheng & Jing Ma, An Analysis of Emerging China's Economy and its
Influence on World Economy, 2 RES. IN WoRLD ECON. 21, 21 (2011) (noting that China is cur-
rently the world's second largest economy and expected to overtake the United States by
approximately 2030).
10. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview, 622 AN-
NALs Am. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 7, 13 (2009) (using the term "class action" for "civil lawsuits
on behalf of large numbers of identifiable but absent parties: other actors who would have
standing to bring their own lawsuits but are not formally present in court").
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U.S. reforms offered by others. The analysis concludes that, in light
of Chinese law on securities class actions, the U.S. reform proposals
are problematic from the perspective of U.S. investors and interna-
tional comity. Instead, we recommend a clear, narrow amendment
to Section 10(b). Our proposal advocates extending the right of
U.S. investors to bring securities fraud class actions against non-U.S.
companies whose securities trade on U.S. securities exchanges re-
gardless of where those investors entered into the relevant
securities transactions. The proposal balances the comity concerns
articulated in Morrison with the benefits of investor protection and
market integrity.
I. BRIEF HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF CLASS ACTIONS IN
SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Class action lawsuits alleging securities fraud under Section
10(b) are governed by both federal securities and civil procedure
laws. Commentators have long debated the extent to which the SEC
may be more effective and efficient at enforcing the securities laws
than private plaintiffs. 1 In partial response, Congress imposed spe-
cific restraints on securities law class actions in the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.12 Still, the basic rules of class actions
apply in securities fraud lawsuits. Thus, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (Rule 23) governs certification of classes in those
lawsuits. 13 Whether discussing class actions or private rights of ac-
tion for securities fraud, or both, scholars frequently articulate the
underlying goals as some combination of compensation and deter-
rence.' 4 An extensive literature exists, however, considering and
disagreeing on whether the U.S. system of private rights of action
11. See, e.g.,JamesJ. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws,
100 CALIF. L. REv. 115, 123 (2012) (discussing Joseph Grundfest's proposal for the SEC to
increase the hurdles for private plaintiffs).
12. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1
to 78u-5 (2006)).
13. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23; United Steel Workers Int'l Union v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593
F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 2010).
14. See, e.g., Black, supra note 1, at 806 (referring to "the two rationales-compensation
and deterrence-for the federal securities class action"); Coffee, supra note 1, at 1538 ("From
a policy perspective, the securities class action has two potential rationales: compensation
and deterrence."); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation,
2009 Wis. L. Rav. 333, 336 ("[P]rivate securities litigation is typically described as serving two
goals: compensation and deterrence."); Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Ac-
tion Governance, 37 IND. L. REv. 65, 70 (2003) ("There are two substantive justifications for
permitting groups to litigate through the class action mechanism: compensation and
deterrence.").
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under Section 10(b), and particularly of class actions under the sec-
tion, is effective in achieving either deterrence or compensation
and what to do about the perceived deficiencies.' 5
Section 10(b) prohibits the "use . . . in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security... [of] any manipulative or decep-
tive device ... ."6 Facially, that language establishes a flexible
prohibition on securities fraud. Some recent commentators have
argued, though, that the pendulum has swung too far in favor of
securities issuers, as Congress and the Supreme Court have cabined
the application of Section 10(b) by establishing significant hurdles
for plaintiffs. In the authors' view, the most substantial of these hur-
dles are limitations on discovery, the need to state particularized
claims, and the requirement to show loss causation.'
7
To state a securities fraud claim under Section 10(b), a private
"plaintiff must allege the following: (1) a material misrepresenta-
tion or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or
sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omis-
sion; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.' 8 Courts continue
to struggle with questions about the extent to which plaintiffs must
offer proof of various elements of a Section 10(b) case at the class
certification stage. This and other issues encountered by courts
when certifying a class in a securities fraud case typically require
analysis of the intersection of the applicable section of Rule 23 with
the elements of a Section 10(b) claim.' 9
15. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
17. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cosenza, Paradise Lost: § 10(b) after Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, 11 CHI.J. INT'L L. 343, 372 (2011) ("[T]he Supreme Court has recently reinforced the
need to construe narrowly the implied private right of action under § 10(b)."); Amanda M.
Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Pri-
vate Enforcement of Rule lob-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1349 (2008) ("Securities class action
reform efforts to date have tended to follow the narrowing approach."). But see A.C. Pritch-
ard, Securities Law in the Roberts Court:Agenda orIndifference?, 37J. CoP. L. 105, 142-43 (2011)
("Tellabs, Halliburton, and Jones all rebuffed efforts by lower courts to narrow the gates
through which securities class actions could proceed.").
18. In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 2d 712, 746 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
19. For example, in its 2011 decision in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., the
Supreme Court held that loss causation did not need to be proven at the class certification
stage, reversing a decision by the Fifth Circuit that a plaintiff must "prove the separate ele-
ment of loss causation in order to establish that reliance was capable of resolution on a
common, classwide basis." 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184-86 (2011). One issue on which the circuits
remain divided is whether plaintiffs must prove materiality in a misrepresentation case before
a district court may grant class certification in a case where the plaintiffs seek to rely on the
fraud-on-the-market theory. Compare In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 631 (3d Cir.
2011) (holding that proof of materiality is not required to certify a class that relies on the
fraud-on-the-market presumption), and Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir.
2010) (same), with In reSalomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 481 (2d Cir. 2008)
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This Article focuses on the implications of the Supreme Court's
decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.20 for the use of
class actions in transnational securities fraud settings. In Morrison,
the Supreme Court considered what has come to be known as an F-
cubed case-one where foreign plaintiffs bring a class action alleg-
ing a fraud violation under Section 10(b) by a foreign defendant
regarding securities the plaintiffs purchased on a foreign exchange.
One defendant, National Australia Bank Ltd. (NAB), had issued se-
curities that traded on the Australian Stock Exchange Limited and
a variety of other exchanges, and its American Depository Receipts
(ADRs) traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in the
United States.2 1 After the sole U.S. lead plaintiff dropped out early
in the litigation, the remaining class members were all Australian
investors who had purchased their NAB stock on an Australian ex-
change. 2 They alleged that NAB had committed fraud in violation
of Section 10(b) by misstating the financial results of a U.S.
subsidiary.
23
The Second Circuit had applied the widely accepted conduct
and effects test, which permitted a securities fraud case to be
brought in the United States if it alleged that either "'the wrongful
conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or upon U.S.
citizens"' or "'the wrongful conduct occurred in the United
States." 24 The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Congress
did not evidence an intent that Section 10(b) should have extrater-
ritorial application.2 5 The majority did not believe that fraud
actions in cases involving transnational factors are necessary to pro-
tect U.S. markets, stating: "While there is no reason to believe that
the United States has become the Barbary Coast for those perpe-
trating frauds on foreign securities markets, some fear that it has
become the Shangri-La of class-action litigation for lawyers repre-
senting those allegedly cheated in foreign securities markets."
26
(holding that plaintiffs must prove materiality before class certification in order to rely on
the fraud-on-the-market presumption), Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom,
Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 2007) (same), and In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432
F.3d 1, 7 & n.l (1st Cir. 2005) (stating in dictum that plaintiffs must prove materiality to
gain class certification). The Supreme Court decided in Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement
Plans and Trust Funds that plaintiffs are not required to prove materiality as a prerequisite to
the certification of a § 10(b) claim. 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1199 (2013).
20. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
21. Id. at 2875.
22. Id. at 2876.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2879 (quoting SEC v. Burger, 322 F.3d 187, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2003)).
25. Id. at 2883.
26. Id. at 2886.
1320 [VOL. 46:4
SUMMER 2013] Securities Class Actions: China and Comity Concerns 1321
Under the Court's formulation, the only transactions to which Sec-
tion 10(b) can be applied are those that are "in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange,
and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United
States.
2 7
The key to the Supreme Court majority's analysis, and the por-
tion on which two concurring Justices disagreed, was its definition
of what constitutes an extraterritorial application of Section 10(b).
First, the majority focused on the language of Section 10(b), which
extends only to fraud that is connected with "the purchase or sale
of' a security.28 Using that as a limiting principle, it focused on se-
curities traded on U.S. exchanges and other purchases or sales
within the United States.2 9 After referring to other sections of fed-
eral securities law, the Court turned to consideration of the
potential effects of F-cubed Section 10(b) cases on international
comity. The Court recognized that significant differences exist be-
tween the availability and process of class action litigation and the
definition of securities fraud in the United States as compared to
other countries . 0 In response to the comity concerns, the Solicitor
General advocated a test that would require "significant and mate-
rial conduct" in the United States to support a right of action under
Section 10(b).31 The Court acknowledged the Solicitor General's
opinion that its recommended formulation would be harmonious
with "prevailing notions of international comity" but rejected the
approach as inconsistent with the Court's view that Congress had
failed to express an intent in favor of transnational application of
Section 10(b).
32
The scholarship that has analyzed Morrison consistently recog-
nizes that the decision significantly narrowed the application of
Section 10(b) as compared to the conduct and effects test used for
many years by the circuits.33 In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Congress responded to the Morrison
decision by granting the SEC jurisdiction to pursue 10(b) actions
27. Id. at 2888.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
29. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884-85.
30. Id. at 2885-86.
31. Id. at 2887.
32. Id. at 2887-88.
33. See, e.g., Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of Extra-
territorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 568 (2011) ("Morison
clearly narrowed the extraterritorial application of the securities laws from the previous state
of affairs under the old conduct and effects tests."); Pritchard, supra note 17, at 139 ("The
second area where the Roberts Court has confined securities class actions is the extraterrito-
rial reach of the federal securities laws.").
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where an actor engages in "(1) conduct within the United States
that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation,
even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States
and involves only foreign investors; or (2) conduct occurring
outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect
within the United States." 34 Congress also required the SEC to study
the extent to which legislative action should be taken to reestablish
private rights of action where those claims would be prohibited by
Morrison.
35
Not surprisingly, given the short time that has elapsed since Mor-
rison and its departure from years of lower court jurisprudence,
neither scholars nor courts agree on the precise boundaries of se-
curities class actions in the post-Morrison era.3 6 One important
category of issues involves cases brought by classes of U.S. investors
to enforce Section 10(b) for securities transactions they made on a
non-U.S. exchange. To date, the lower courts have uniformly dis-
missed claims associated with those transactions, holding that the
34. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b) (2) (B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa(b) (West 2012). But see Rich-
ard Painter, Douglas Dunham & Ellen Quackenbos, When Courts and Congress Don't Say What
They Mean: Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (2011) (arguing that
Congress failed to extend the scope of the SEC's extraterritorial powers because the statutory
language grants the SEC subject matter jurisdiction whereas the Supreme Court's decision
was based on the scope of Sectionl0(b)). A parallel may be drawn here between the Con-
gress' grant of power to the SEC and its similar response to the Supreme Court's decision in
CentralBank ofDenverv. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), that Section 10(b)
does not provide a cause of action for aiding and abetting securities fraud. Although after the
Central Bank decision the SEC Chairman argued in favor of an amendment providing for
private causes of actions, Congress passed legislation granting the SEC, but not investors, the
power to bring aiding and abetting actions. See Shuenn (Patrick) Ho, Recent Development, A
Missed Opportunity for "Wall Street Reform": Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud After the Dodd-
Frank Act, 49 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 175, 187-88 (2012). Many have argued that the SEC has been
ineffective in addressing the problem of aiding and abetting securities fraud, whether
through a lack of resources or insufficient interest in the issue, and legislation has been
proposed to permit private civil actions. See, e.g., U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILrTv OFFICE, GAO-1I-
664, SECURuTIEs FRAUD LIABILrTY OF SECONDARY AcroRs (2011) (reviewing the controversy
regarding private actions to address aiding and abetting of securities fraud); Ho, supra, at
183-90; Melissa C. Nunziato, Comment, Aiding and Abetting, a Madoff Family Affair: Why Secon-
dary Actors Should be Held Accountable for Securities Fraud Through the Restoration of the Private
Right of Action for Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 73 ALB. L. REV.
603 (2010); cf. Joseph A. Franco, Of Complicity and Compliance: A Rules-Based Anti-Complicity
Strategy Under Federal Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 1 (2011) (arguing for anti-complicity
policies as a way of targeting those who provide assistance to securities fraud violators).
35. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 929Y(a) (2010). The study
evaluated a variety of options but did not make a final recommendation. SEC STUDY, supra
note 8.
36. See SEC STUDY, supra note 8, at 28-38 (discussing post-Morrison litigation in the lower
courts).
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Morrison test precludes them.3 7 As discussed below in Part IV.B, our
reform proposal is targeted at that category of cases.
The commentary on Morrison has been extensive, but there is no
clear path forward on the appropriate scope of class action securi-
ties fraud lawsuits in situations with transnational factors. At one
end of the spectrum are proposals that would protect non-U.S.
companies from all or most class action fraud lawsuits. The most
thoroughly argued of those proposals is offered by Professor Fox
who, after engaging in a detailed analysis based largely on ineffi-
ciencies associated with other approaches, argues that non-U.S.
companies should only be subject to U.S. securities fraud actions if
they explicitly choose to be subject to those actions (Fox Propo-
sal).38 The opposite perspective, from those who argue that the
class actions claiming U.S. securities fraud should be widely availa-
ble to non-U.S. investors and against non-U.S. companies, tends to
advocate a return to some version of the conduct and effects stan-
dard developed by the lower courts (Conduct and Effects
Proposals) . 9 After the next Part analyzes the development and
availability of class action securities fraud litigation in China, Part
III will consider how the differing regulatory approaches of the
United States and China result in more significant differences in
the rights of action for shareholders than is superficially apparent
based on the comparative regulatory regimes.
37. See, e.g., In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 2d 712, 793-97 (S.D. Tex. 2012); In re
Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 522, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Royal Bank
of Scot. Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Other even more
complex questions are beyond the scope of this Article, including the extent to which trans-
actions involving ADRs, derivatives, or swaps may serve as the basis for a private right of
action. See, e.g., SEC S-runy, supra note 8, at 30-31, 36-38.
38. Fox, supra note 7, at 1272-73. For a more detailed discussion of Professor Fox's
argument see infra Part W.A.
39. See, e.g., SEC STuDY, supra note 8, at 49 n.179 (citing thirty-nine comment letters
supporting statutory adoption of the conduct and effects test). A variety of proposals advo-
cate adopting a test that would permit a greater range of class actions than allowed by the
Morrison test but less than a return to the full conduct and effects test. See, e.g., id. at 55-58
(outlining various alternative approaches proposed by commenters); Cosenza, supra note 17,
at 343 (proposing a test permitting private actions where those actions meet both a conduct
and effects requirement); Marco Ventoruzzo, Like Moths to A Flame? International Securities
Litigation After Morrison: Correcting the Supreme Court's "Transactional Test," 52 VA. J. INT'L L.
405 (2012) (proposing a revised effects test); E-mail from Forty-Two Law Professors to Eliza-
beth M. Murphy, Sec'y, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n (Feb. 18, 2011), available at http://www.sec.
gov/comments/4-617/4617-28.pdf (proposing a fraud-in-the inducement test).
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF CLASS ACTION SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION
IN CHINA
This Part begins by providing an overview of China's securities
markets and regulation. In the next section, it discusses the current
status of class action securities fraud litigation. It then analyzes early
cases of class action securities fraud litigation in China in some de-
tail. Finally, it considers the 2012 amendments to China's Civil
Procedure Law (CPL), 40 which are intended to expand access to
class actions.
A. China's Securities Exchanges and Securities Law
The first modern stock exchanges were established in China in
the early 1990s, 41 and the initial national securities legislation fol-
lowed in 1998.42 As of the end of 2009, 870 companies were listed
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, China's largest exchange, with a
market capitalization of $2.78 trillion.43 The other major exchange,
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, consists of three boards with 830
listed companies and a total market capitalization of $1.4 trillion. In
roughly comparable data, the U.S.-based NYSE had the world's larg-
est domestic equity market capitalization at the end of 2011 at
almost $12 trillion. The NASDAQ also a U.S. exchange, was second
at approximately $3.8 trillion. The Shanghai Stock Exchange was
the sixth largest in the world.
44
The growth of the Chinese exchanges, even during the global
financial crisis, has been substantial. Between 2007 and 2009, the
40. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (
[Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (CPL)] (promulgated by the Stand-
ing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Apr. 1, 2008).
41. See Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & Chen Jian-Lin, Reforming China's Securities Civil Actions:
Lessons from PSLRA Reform in the U.S. and Government-Sanctioned Non-Profit Enforcement in Tai-
wan, 21 COLUM.J. ASIAN L. 115, 121 (2008).
42. See Guo Li & Allan VY. Ong, The Fledgling Securities Fraud Litigation in China, 39 H.K.
L.J. 697, 697-98 (2009).
43. See Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF] & The World Bank, IOSCO Objectives and Principles for
Securities Regulation: Detailed Assessment of Observance, at 4, IMF Country Report No.12/80
(Mar. 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/scr/2012/crl280.pdf.
44. See World Fed'n of Exchs. [WFE], 2011 WFE Market Highlights, at 6 (Jan. 19 2012),
available at http://www.world-exchanges.org/files/file/stats%20and%20charts/2011%20
WFE%20Market%20Highlights.pdf. Tokyo and the London Stock Exchange were third and
fourth respectively. Id.
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total market capitalization of public companies approximately trip-
led. During the same period, the number of securities accounts in
China more than doubled to over 170 million individual accounts. 45
Although foreigners may purchase certain types of securities on
China's exchanges, only Chinese companies may list their securities
on those exchanges. 46 Chinese companies may issue a variety of
classes of stock, which are conventionally labeled as A shares or B
shares.47 If a company lists its A Shares (the basic type of shares) on
a Chinese exchange, then it also is permitted to list B shares. Typi-
cally, the only types of shares that foreign investors are permitted to
purchase are B shares and, in turn, B shares are held only by for-
eign investors.
48
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has en-
gaged in some preliminary planning in the event that listings by
non-Chinese companies are permitted in the future.49 It appears
reasonably probable that China will launch an International Board
at the Shanghai Stock Exchange on which the securities of non-
Chinese companies could be listed during the next few years.
50
The current version of the Securities Law of China became effec-
tive in 2006.51 The stated goals of the Chinese securities law are to
"standardize the issuing and trading of securities, protect the lawful
rights and interests of investors, safeguard the economic order and
45. See IMF & The World Bank, supra note 43, at 6. In addition, China has multiple
futures exchanges. Id. at 4-6.
46. See Zhang Yong, China's International Board a Step Closer, ECON. OBSERVER, Sep. 20,
2010, at 23, available at http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/financeinvestment/2010/09/23/
181547.shtml. But see Amy Li, Shanghai Bourse: No "Material Plan"for International Board, Dow
JONES VENrTuRE WIRE (June 4, 2012), http://pevc.dowjones.com/article?an=DJFVW0002012
0604e864qe57q&from=alert&pid=32&RetumUrl=http%3a%2f%2fpevc.dowjones.com%3a
80%2farticle%3fan%3dDJFVW00020120604e864qe57q%26from%3dalert%26pid%3d32
("The Shanghai Stock Exchange said Monday it has no 'material plan' for launching an
international board on which foreign companies can list... ").
47. See Wei Shen, Face Off: Is China a Preferred Regime for International Private Equity Invest-
ments? Decoding a "China Myth"from the Chinese Company Law Perspective, 26 CONN. J. INT'L L.
89, 99 (2010). A discussion of the differences between the various categories of shares is
beyond the scope of this Article. Foreigners are permitted to purchase A shares in China only
if they are approved as Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII). Jiangyu Wang, Danc-
ing with Wolves: Regulation and Deregulation of Foreign Investment in China's Stock Market, 5 Astask-
PAc. L. & PoL'vJ. 1, 22-24 (2004). Changes in late 2011 created an expectation that the
typical time period to gain approval as a QFII would shrink from one to two years to about six
months. See Rocky T. Lee, Opportunity to Invest in China's Securities Market: The Accelerated Ap-
proval Process for Foreign Financial Institutions, C~ADwA.ADEl (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.
cadwalader.com/assets/client-friend/031612AccelaratedApprovalProcessForeignFinInst.
pdf.
48. See Shen, supra note 47, at 99.
49. See IMF & The World Bank, supra note 43, at 54.
50. See Yong, supra note 46.
51. See Li & Ong, supra note 42, at 698.
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public interests of society and promote the development of the so-
cialist market economy."52 Thus, although investor protection is a
concern of the statute, that concern must be balanced with consid-
erations of the regulatory effects on the Chinese economy.
Primary regulatory responsibility is held by the CSRC, and private
rights of action have not been used extensively in securities fraud.53
One significant limitation on private rights of action is that there
are only two circumstances in which courts are permitted to hear
lawsuits brought by investors alleging false statements: either the
CSRC must have made a prior decision on an administrative pen-
alty or the People's Court (as the lower courts are designated) must
have issued a finding of a false statement in a criminal case brought
by the People's Procuratorate, the entity with prosecutorial power.54
The net effect is that the right of securities investors to bring mis-
representation claims is dependent on the government's
willingness to bring a prior action based on the same facts. Both the
CSRC and the People's Procuratorate have limited resources to
pursue actions.55 Further, the administrative processes of the CSRC
and the People's Procuratorate have been criticized for lack of
transparency, and questions of bribery and political or social influ-
ences have been raised. 56 Other limitations on private rights of
action to pursue misstatement claims are based in the regulation of
suits brought by more than one party, which is discussed in the next
section. Finally, private securities fraud claims may be brought only
in cases involving publicly traded securities.57
The revisions to China's securities laws that became effective in
2006 resulted from the growth and changes in China's securities
markets in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Professors Baoshu Wang
and Hui Huang identify four factors as the basis for the 2006 re-
forms: (1) development of various corporate ownership structures,
including entities with primarily state ownership and others with
solely private ownership; (2) a decrease in government influence
and increase in market forces; (3) a need to liberalize certain as-
pects of the 1999 Securities Law; and (4) the existence of corporate
fraud, resulting in decreased investor confidence and falling values
52. Roman Tomasic &Jian Fu, The Securities Law of the People's Republic of China: An Over-
view, 10 Ausn.. J. CoRp. L. 268, 271 (1999).
53. See Li & Ong, supra note 42, at 698.
54. See id. at 705-06; see also infra note 127 (discussing the limited rights of individuals to
initiate government actions).
55. See Li & Ong, supra note 42, at 706.
56. See id. at 707.
57. See id. at 701.
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on the stock exchanges. 58 One example of changes included in the
2006 revisions is that, similar to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
1999 in the United States,59 the structural segmentation of banking,
securities, and insurance entities was decreased. 60 This responded
to the concern identified by Wang & Huang that portions of the
1999 Act needed to be liberalized in order to decrease regulatory
boundaries among institutions and increase the synergies in finan-
cial sector firms.
Professor Wang JiangYu has argued that since 1998 China has
shifted its securities regulatory approach from one based on gov-
ernment control to a more disclosure-based system. 61 He cites
numerous requirements of full and accurate disclosure that are spe-
cific to initial public offerings.62 However, China's securities law
does not contain provisions permitting groups of investors to bring
lawsuits to enforce the requirement that companies issue the re-
quired disclosure. Instead, their rights are limited to pursuing cases
of inaccurate disclosure.63 Recent reports of government-backed in-
terference with attempts by investors to investigate Chinese
companies may indicate a retrenchment of the trend toward in-
creased corporate disclosure.
64
In sum, China's securities markets have developed rapidly since
the opening of the first modern exchange in the early nineties.
Regulatory reform has followed but, even apart from the restrictive
class action procedures discussed in the next section, protections
for shareholders remain substantially less robust than in the United
States. A recent report coauthored by the IMF and The World Bank
concluded that:
[T]he legal system (in particular, the commercial courts) and
the effect of market discipline provided by institutional inves-
tors and other participants on corporate governance is not as
58. See Baoshu Wang & Hui Huang, China's New Company Law and Securities Law: An
Overview and Assessment, 19 AusTL. J. CORP. L. 229, 229-31 (2006).
59. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
60. See Wang & Huang, supra note 58, at 237.
61. See Wang JiangYu, Regulation of Initial Public Offering of Shares in China, 76 CHINA L.
54, 63 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1382577.
62. Id. at 63-74; see also Xiao Huang, Modernising the Chinese Capital Market: Old Problems
and New Legal Responses, 21 INT'L COMPANY & COM. L. REv. 26, 37 (2010) (discussing the
information requirements for initial public offerings).
63. See Walter Hutchens, Private Securities Litigation in China: Material Disclosure About
China's Legal System? 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 599, 629 (2003).
64. See Dinny McMahon & Kathy Chu, Clampdown in China on Corporate Sleuthing, WALL
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significant in China as in other jurisdictions . . . In combina-
tion, these factors undermine the capacity of private legal
action to have a meaningful practical impact on compliance.
65
B. The Current Legal System of Class Action Litigation in China
The closest Chinese parallel to the United States' Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23's class action provisions can be found in the
CPL, China's general civil procedure law. In addition to traditional
litigation involving one plaintiff against one defendant, three provi-
sions in China's current CPL appear on their face to permit
litigation to be brought by or against more than one person or en-
tity. The first possibility is joint litigation. The second is
representative litigation where each party is known when the suit is
filed. The third is representative litigation where some parties re-
main unidentified at the time of filing. Each of these types of
litigation is explained below.
CPL Article 53 sets forth the rules for joint litigation, also called
"non-representative group litigation."66 If there are two or more
persons as either plaintiff or defendant and the subject matter of
the action is the same or of the same category, the litigation is re-
ferred to as joint litigation.67 If the number of plaintiffs or
defendants reaches ten, the litigation typically would be brought as
one of the two types of representative litigation discussed next, not
joint litigation. 68 A lower court, known as a People's Court, may, at
its discretion, adjudicate the claims together as a joint action if all
parties consent. If the joint parties have common rights and obliga-
tions with respect to the subject matter of the lawsuit and an action
by any of them that is related to the lawsuit, such as a decision on
65. IMF & The World Bank, supra note 43, at 9.
66. Michael Palmer & Chao Xi, Collective & Representative Actions in China, GLOBAL CLASS
ACTIONS EXCHANGE 2-3 (2007), http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/
documents/ChinaNationalReport.pdf.
67. CPL art. 53 (1991). Technically, Article 53 applies to all categories of class action
litigation, but it typically is viewed as primarily governing joint litigation. See Palmer & Xi,
supra note 66, at 2.
68. "The circumstance [sic] 'one party has numerous litigants' as prescribed in Articles
54 and 55 of the Civil Procedure Law generally refers to ten persons or more." Zuigao
Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa Ruogan
Wenti De Yijian( . z d j. t.i[L:i/i zf]il',.)
[Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application of the
Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Sup. People's Ct.,
July 14, 1992), available at http://www.cietac.org/index/references/Laws/47607cb9bOf4987f
OO1.cms; see also Palmer & Xi, supra note 66, at 4.
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counsel, is recognized by the others, that act is legally binding on
the other members. If the joint parties do not have any common
rights or obligations regarding the claims, any acts taken by any
member will not be legally binding on the other members. 69
Alternatively, CPL Article 54 provides for representative litigation
involving ten or more plaintiffs or defendants where all of the par-
ties to the suit are identified at the time the suit is filed. The
representatives elected by all of the litigants-who collectively are
known as principals-are permitted to bring the litigation. Many of
the actions taken by the representatives are binding on all princi-
pals. Certain actions, however, including claims modifications or
waivers and negotiated settlements, must be approved by all of the
principals.
70
Finally, CPL Article 55 permits representative litigation with un-
identified multiple parties. If the number of plaintiffs or defendants
is not known at the time the lawsuit is filed but the subject matter of
the action is of the same category, then the People's Court may
accept the filing. In such a case, the People's Court may, at its dis-
cretion, issue a public notice to explain the claims. Interested
parties then have a fixed period of time to register their rights with
the court.7 1 The registration period must be a minimum of thirty
days. Once the registration process has ended, the principals elect
representatives to proceed with the litigation. If the election does
not determine the representatives, the People's Court may appoint
the representatives through consultation with all of the registered
parties. As with the representative litigation where the parties are
known at the time the suit is filed, many actions taken by the repre-
sentatives are binding on the principals while others require
approval. All court judgments and orders are binding on all regis-
tered parties and on anyone who has not registered his or her
rights but brought legal actions during a specified period, typically
two years.
72
In sum, the CPL provides for multiple types of class action litiga-
tion, including representative litigation with large numbers of
plaintiffs who are not yet identified when a suit is filed. The next
section, however, explains that the Supreme People's Court of the
People's Republic of China (Supreme People's Court) has, in ef-
fect, limited suits that allege securities fraud to the use of joint
69. CPL art. 53 (1991); see also Li & Ong, supra note 42, at 709-12 (discussing the use of
joint actions in securities fraud cases).
70. See CPL art. 54 (1991).
71. See CPL art. 55 (1991).
72. See Palmer & Xi, supra note 66, at 5.
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litigation. Part III analyzes a variety of factors that discourage the
use of even joint litigation.
C. Early Class Action Securities Fraud Litigation in China
Depending on one's definition, two cases vie for designation as
the "first" Chinese class action securities fraud lawsuit. In 2001, 363
investors filed a class action suit against Yorkpoint Science & Tech-
nology Co. 73 However, the following day, the Supreme People's
Court promulgated a notice temporarily prohibiting lower courts
from accepting securities lawsuits from private parties.74 That re-
sulted in the dismissal of the action. Based on statements by one of
the justices of the Supreme People's Court, the rationales for the
temporary prohibition were that courts lacked the experience and
resources to try and decide securities lawsuits and that the securities
markets were too immature to risk the potential costs of legal ac-
tions brought by investors.
75
In early 2002, the Supreme People's Court issued a notice enti-
tled "Acceptance of Cases of Disputes over Civil Tort Arising from
False Statements in the Securities Market" ("2002 Securities No-
tice"). 76 Although it permitted courts to accept securities fraud
suits, the 2002 Securities Notice prohibited plaintiffs from bringing
"group action[s] ,,77 Commentators have different views regarding
the meaning of this language .7  Professors Liu and Xu, however,
agree with the commentators who believe that it has been applied
in Chinese securities litigation to mean that those cases must, in
effect, be brought as either individual actions or joint actions. 79
Within days of the 2002 Securities Notice, investors filed Chen v.
Daqing Lianyi Co., the first class action case to be permitted to state
73. See id. at 6.
74. See Jun Xie & Lijuan Sun, Access to Collective Litigations in China: A Tough Work, 3J.
POL. & L. 45, 47 (2010).
75. See Palmer & Xi, supra note 66, at 6; Xie & Sun, supra note 74, at 47.
76. See Li & Ong, supra note 42, at 704 & n.17.
77. See Palmer & Xi, supra note 66, at 6.
78. See Donald C. Clarke, The Private Attorney-General in China: Potential and Pitfalls, 8
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 241, 249 (2009) (stating that securities litigation cannot be
brought as "representative actions under article 54 . . . "); Palmer & Xi, supa note 66, at 6
(stating a belief that securities litigation cannot be brought under Article 55).
79. Because of the relative scarcity of English-language published material on securities
fraud claims involving more than one plaintiff or defendant, this Article relies in part on the
expertise of Professors Liu and Xu, both of whom are law professors at well-respected law
schools in China. See also infra text accompanying notes 83-89 (discussing the decision of a
Chinese court to break a securities fraud action into small groups of plaintiffs).
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a claim of securities fraud.80 The case did not proceed, however,
until the Supreme People's Court issued a type of statement known
as a Provision, which outlines the civil procedure to be used in cases
of securities misrepresentations (2003 Securities Provisions). 81 In
Provisions, the Supreme People's Court states its view, outside the
context of particular litigation, on legal issues of import. Sources
are divided as to whether Provisions have the legal effect of legisla-
tion or of judicial review, but there is agreement that they do have
legal force.
82
In 1999, the CSRC had begun an investigation into Daqing
Lianyi Co.'s (Daqing) revenue statements in its 1997 prospectus
and annual report.8 3 Daqing's board of directors publicly acknowl-
edged the investigation. 84 The CSRC subsequently determined that
Daqing had made untruthful statements in the 1997 prospectus and
annual report. 85 The CSRC's administrative penalty against Daqing
provided the necessary government action to enable a suit to be
brought by Daqing's investors based on the untruthful revenue rep-
resentations. 86 The defendants were Daqing and Shenyin Wanguao
Securities Corporation, the entity that was the listing recommender
and main underwriter of the securities during the public offering.
87
The court required the 381 original plaintiffs to divide into groups
of ten to twenty, presumably either to come within the general pa-
rameters of Section 53 joint litigation 88 or to receive a favorable
judicial evaluation as a result of hearing more cases.
89
The case involved a number of issues-allocation of liability,
whether causation existed, determination of economic damages,
80. Chen Lihua Deng 23 Ming Touziren Su Daqing Lianyi Gongsi, Shenyin Zhengquan
Gongsi ( 3 ). . .0 }-J [,, ,.I}..
[Chen v. Daqing Lianyi Co.] (Heilongjiang Province Interm. People's Ct. Aug. 19, 2004). For
the convenience of the reader, whenever possible this Article cites secondary resources in its
discussion of the case involving Daqing Lianyi. See Li & Ong, supra note 42, at 704. A ques-
tionably translated version of the appellate court's decision is available at http://www.
eastlaw.net/cases/corp/Daqinglianyi.htm.
81. Xi Chao, Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China: Daqing Lianyi Co. v. Zhong
Weida and Others (2004) Heilongjian High Court, I J. COMP. L. 492, 493 (2006).
82. See M. Ulric Killion, Quest for Legal Safeguards for Foreign Exporters Under China's Anti-
Dumping Regime, 29 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 417, 446 (2004); Palmer & Xi, supra note 66,
at 1 (calling the explanations "binding on all courts").
83. See Ling Dai, Comment, The Judicial Application of the Causation Test of the False State-
ment Doctrine in Securities Litigation in China, 15 PAC. Rim L. & POL'YJ. 733, 755 (2006).
84. See id.
85. See id.; Charles Zhen Qu, An Outsider's View on China's Insider Trading Law, 10 PAC.
RIM L. & POL'YJ. 327, 330 n.12 (2001).
86. See Dai, supra note 83, at 755-56.
87. See Li & Ong, supra note 42, at 699.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 114-17.
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and application of the statute of limitations-that are not relevant
for purposes of this Article. It did not evaluate whether the revenue
statements were false since the 1999 announcement of the investi-
gation by Daqing's board of directors admitted the inaccurate
nature of the reported revenues. The Chinese appellate court par-
tially upheld an award in favor of twenty-three investors on claims
that false statements had been made about Daqing.90 The plaintiff
investors were therefore successful in that they were awarded part
of the damages they sought.91
D. Proposed Extensions of Rights of Action on Behalf of
Multiple Investors
China recently amended the CPL to extend rights of action on
behalf of multiple parties. The initial legislation proposing the
addition of a new class-action-like provision to the CPL was intro-
duced in October 2011. We refer here to that proposed legislation
as the 2011 CPL Draft. The legislation proposed using public inter-
est litigation, which has been used by some other countries to
permit governmental authorities or social organizations to act as
intermediaries on behalf of harmed individuals. 92 Specifically, the
2011 CPL Draft proposed to add the following article as Article 55:
"Relevant authorities and social organizations may take litigations
against the infringements of the public interest especially those in-
volving environmental pollution or damaging mass consumers'
legal rights and interests."93 Professors Liu, Xu, and others believe
that the increasing problem of environmental pollution, food safety
scandals in China, and the difficulties of pursuing class actions
under the existing CPL provisions were the motivating forces that
led some members of the National People's Congress (NPC) 94 and
related interest groups to support the mechanism of public interest
90. See Dai, supra note 83, at 755-57.
91. See id. at 757.
92. See, e.g., Wang &Jian-Lin, supra note 41, at 143-44 (discussing Taiwan's use of inter-
mediary plaintiffs).
93. Minshi Susong Fa Xiu Zheng An (Cao An) Tiaowen Ji Cao An Shuoming
( Ji~iE_ ()) J) [The Provisions of the Amendment Draft of
Civil Procedure Law and the Explanation of the Draft] (promulgated Oct. 29, 2011), available
at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/syxw/2011-1O/29/content_1678367.htm.
94. Palmer & Xi, supra note 66, at 1; see also IMF & The World Bank, supra note 43, at 7.
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litigation.95 Early indications were that the provision would be avail-
able to address a wide variety of issues, 96 including, in the view of
Professors Liu and Xu, violations of China's securities laws.
When the NPC Standing Committee returned to the proposal in
April 2012, the approach became more conservative by limiting the
entities that can bring suits to relevant authorities and "related or-
ganizations."97 Deputy Director Li of the NPC Law Committee has
stated that the more limited proposal is meant "to ensure a sound
practice" and prevent class actions from being overused.98 He also
analogized the proposed public interest provision to existing legis-
lation that empowers the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) to
file a claim if "severe damage" is done to the oceanic environ-
ment.99 The SOA power that Deputy Director Li refers to derives
from a specialized procedural provision in the Marine Environment
Protection Law, which enables the SOA to seek, on behalf of the
state, to hold polluters liable for severe damage suffered by the state
arising from infringements of marine ecosystems, marine fishery re-
sources, and marine protected areas. 100
In late August 2012, the NPC Standing Committee passed
amendments to the CPL that were then approved by President Hu
Jintao and became effective on January 1, 2013.101 Under Article 55
of the new CPL, relevant authorities and "related organizations"
will have standing to bring suits where "the public health and/or
public safety is at risk. '102 As security frauds damage the legal rights
and interests of large numbers of investors, Professors Liu and Xu
believe that the amendments to the CPL may become a legal
weapon that Chinese investors injured by securities fraud can wield.
95. See, e.g., Zhou Tao, Lawsuits in the Public Interest, CHINA.ORG.CN (Oct. 26, 2011), http:/
/www.china.org.cn/opinion/2011-10/26/content_23728183.htm.
96. Some members of the NPC Standing Committee proposed that the class action law
should be applied to destruction of cultural relics. See Li Xiao, What Makes a Public Interest
Plaintqf?, CHINA.ORG.CN (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2011-11/08/con-
tent._23845547.htm.
97. See Richard W. Wigley, China's Civil Procedure Law Reported to be Amended to Broaden
Definition of Types of Litigants Allowed to File Class-Action Lawsuits, CHINA L. INSIGHT (Sept. 13,
2012), http://www.chinalawinsight.com/tags/related-organizations/ (follow "Continue
Reading" hyperlink).
98. Zhao Yinan, Draft Limits Scale of Class-Action Lawsuits, CHINA DAILY (Apr. 25, 2012,
7:39 AM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-04/25/content_15131945.htm.
99. See id.
100. See Xiao, supra note 96.
101. See China Amends Civil Procedure Law Following Third Reading, GOV.CN (Aug. 31,
2012), http://english.gov.cn/2012-08/31/content_2214483.htm.
102. See Richard W. Wigley, China's Civil Procedure Law Reported to be Amended to Broaden
Definition of Types of Litigants Allowed to File Class-Action Lawsuits, CHINA L. INSIGHT (Sept. 13,
2012), http://www.chinalawinsight.com/tags/related-organizations/ (follow "Continue
Reading" hyperlink).
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As explained by Wang Shengming of the NPC Standing Commit-
tee, including "related organizations" in the CPL will allow more
organizations to bring actions than the prior version of the amend-
ments, which would have extended only to "social groups."'10 3 The
term "social group" in China is a technical term that is restricted to
groups that meet particular procedures regarding their registration
and management. 0 4 Most importantly, social groups must register
with a government office and typically must be affiliated with a gov-
ernment agency, 10 5 which is not required of "related organizations."
The expansiveness of the final amendment as compared to the
prior proposal is evidenced by the number of entities that meet
each definition. In 2011, a total of 460,000 social organizations ex-
isted, but only 55 percent of them qualified as social groups. 106
Regulation and court practice will likely be necessary to shape the
definition of "related organization," which is not precisely defined
under China's laws.'
0 7
III. COMPARISON OF CLASS ACTION SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND IN CHINA
In order to consider the comity concerns implicated by the po-
tential extension of U.S. securities fraud class actions to include
those against foreign companies, this Part compares the actual bar-
riers to the use of those actions in the United States and China. It
finds that the obstacles to such actions in China are much higher
than a comparison of China's CPL provisions to the applicable U.S.
standard, Rule 23, would indicate. The first subsection below bases
its analysis on the law in China as it has applied in securities fraud
suits. The next subsection considers how that analysis may be af-
fected by China's 2012 revision of its CPL.
103. See Zhao Yinan, More Groups Can Litigate in Public Interest, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 1, 2012,




107. See id. ("[Viarious government agencies may later publish more specific regulations
to help guide the organizations in their related fields."); Wigley, supra note 102 ("[T]he term
'related organization' is still rather vague in nature and, as such, allow[s] the Courts certain
discretion in determining whether the organization at issue is indeed representing the public
interest . . ").
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A. Evaluation of the Extent of Class Action Securities Fraud Litigation
in the United States and China
As discussed above, China's CPL explicitly provides for multiple
party actions. 0 8 However, numerous barriers exist to the actual use
of those provisions in securities fraud cases.10 9 This subsection be-
gins by comparing the prevalence of class actions in securities fraud
litigation in the United States and China. It next compares the
scope of barriers imposed in each country through judicial and ad-
ministrative factors and then turns to the relevant procedural
considerations.
1. Prevalence of Class Actions Alleging Securities Fraud
Substantial numbers of securities fraud class actions are brought
under federal law in the United States. However, the lack of official
data makes it more difficult to ascertain the prevalence of collective
securities fraud actions in China. One major research entity re-
ported that 188 securities law class actions were filed in the United
States in 2011, as compared to 176 filings in 2010.110 Suits against
Chinese companies listed on U.S. exchanges increased considera-
bly, from just one case in 2009 to ten cases in 2010 and thirty-nine
cases last year."' The increase in class actions filed against Chinese
companies resulted from a spate of frauds by Chinese reverse
merger companies that gained public attention." 2 In contrast, it
does not appear that the annual numbers of class actions filed alleg-
ing securities fraud in China is reported. The result of the 2002
Securities Notice and 2003 Securities Provisions issued by the Su-
preme People's Court is that it appears that only individual and
108. See supra Part II.B.
109. See supra Part II.C.
110. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, ACCOUNTING CLASS ACTION FILINGS AND SETTLEMENTS-
2011 REviEw AND ANALYSIS 1 (2012), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/pubs/xprPub
ResultsCornerstone.aspx?xpST=PubRecent (follow "Accounting Class Action Filings and Set-
tlements-2011 Review and Analysis" hyperlink).
111. These numbers define Chinese companies broadly to include those either legally
domiciled in China or having their primary executive offices in China. SeeJORDAN MILrv ET
AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2011
YEAR-END REVIEW 8-9 (2011), available at http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUBTrends_-
Year-End_121 lUfinal.pdf.
112. See David M. Katz, Chinese Reverse Mergers Spawned U.S. Class Actions, Report Says, CFO
(May 22, 2012), http://www3.cfo.com/article/2012/5/m-a.-reverse-mergers-china-firms-
class-action-cornerstone-research-heli-electronics. For a discussion of Chinese reverse merg-
ers, see Benjamin A. Templin, Chinese Reverse Mergers, Accounting Regimes, and the Rule of Law in
China, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 119, 123-28 (2011).
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joint actions, and perhaps CPL Article 54 representative actions, are
permitted when the allegations involve misrepresentations by a
publicly traded company.' 1i As discussed below, there are a number
of disincentives for Chinese courts to accept or to consolidate joint
actions even to the extent permitted by the Supreme People's
Court.
2. Judicial and Administrative Barriers to Class Actions
Unlike in the United States, the funding and assessment of the
Chinese court system and the role of the state as a substantial owner
in many business enterprises discourage securities fraud class ac-
tions in China. One factor is that case acceptance fees are used to
fund the lower courts,1 14 and smaller claims are charged a higher
percentage case acceptance fee than larger claims. For example, at
the time of the Daqing case, smaller claims were required to pay one
percent of the total remedy sought by all of the plaintiffs, but larger
claims were required to pay one-half of one percent.115 As a result
of the fee differential between large and small claims, the lower
courts have an economic incentive to break class actions into
smaller cases and not to consolidate actions.
China's method of evaluating judicial performance also provides
an incentive for courts to prefer multiple actions over a single, con-
solidated action. One factor on which judges are evaluated is the
number of cases they decide. Although they may combine the cases
when it comes to their decision on the merits, if the cases remain
separate for purposes of legal representation or other metrics, the
judge that hears the case receives more credit for his or her work.'
1 6
This evaluation system ignores the fact that class litigation requires
a significant time commitment by judges to ensure the rules for
collective actions are met.
117
The political relationship of the lower courts with local govern-
ments is another contributing factor to the lack of willingness of
Chinese courts to hear class action cases with large numbers of
plaintiffs. One concern is that social upheaval might result from
113. See supra text accompanying notes 76-82; see also Liang Tao, Where's the Real Beef?,
CHINA'S FoREIGN TRADE, Jan. 2012, at 56, available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcon-
tent.cgi?article= 1020&context=timjiang.
114. See Xin He, Court Finance and Court Responses to Judicial Reforms: A Tale of Two Chinese
Courts, 31 LAw & Po'Y 463, 465 (2009).
115. SeeLi & Ong, supra note 42, at 711.
116. See Tao, supra note 113, at 57.
117. See Clarke, supra note 78, at 249; Xie & Sun, supra note 74, at 49.
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consolidated actions. Commentators have noted this concern that
social unrest might result from class action litigation.118
Similarly, the state's role as a significant shareholder in many
business enterprises and the social and economic power of promi-
nent business executives appears to affect the use of joint actions.
The lower courts are heavily dependent on local governments for
financial resources.11 9 As a result, they may be reluctant to accept
cases where the state is at least implicitly a defendant. Where claims
are brought by significant numbers of investors against the state as
an implied defendant, the government might view the situation as
having elements of social unrest. And an award against an enter-
prise with state ownership is to some extent an award in favor of
citizens against the government. In addition to these political ten-
sions between the courts and the governing political party, the
economic result of imposing liability on an enterprise with long-
term government ownership may be to transfer some of the costs of
the securities fraud to the broader Chinese society.12 0 Although
wages in China have been improving, the average worker there still
earns less than half the world average.' 2' Thus, the potential use of
securities fraud class actions to transfer wealth from the general
populace to shareholders as a class implicates a variety of societal
concerns.
Another political implication observed in the use of securities
fraud class actions in China relates to political power and individual
ownership of defendant corporations. Scholars have noted that in-
dividuals with social or economic power in China have sometimes
been able to avoid civil lawsuits by exerting pressure to avoid or
affect the administrative proceedings that are a necessary prerequi-
site to civil suits, including those brought by groups of
shareholders. 12 2 In fact, the potential influence of politically power-
ful defendants to avoid lawsuits through behind-the-scenes
118. See Clarke, supra note 78, at 248-49; Li & Ong, supra note 42, at 714 ("[T]he govern-
ment may also be restricting access of investors to courts in order to prevent any situations of
social unrest."); Wang &Jian-Lin, supra note 41, at 154 (discussing "the political risk entailed
in a group becoming an interest group, which status may pose a threat to China's political
regime"). It is possible, though, that permitting class actions would promote, rather than
decrease, social stability by providing injured citizens with compensation, deterring wrongful
acts and increasing confidence in the rule of law.
119. See He, supra note 114, at 465.
120. See Wang &Jian-Lin, supra note 41, at 155.
121. Kenneth Rapoza, U.N. Shocker: Chinese Workers Underpaid, ForaEs (Apr. 4, 2012, 5:00
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/04/04/u-n-shocker-chinese-workers-
underpaid/.
122. See Li & Ong, supra note 42, at 707-08.
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intervention in administrative proceedings is particularly interest-
ing in the context of avoiding group actions because one of the
generally recognized advantages of group actions is to permit
claims to be brought by small shareholders for whom individual
claims typically would not be cost-effective. In China, the increased
power of individual shareholders that is achieved through a class
action may be undermined by the ability of a politically-connected
individual business owner to avoid the action through intervention
by a government authority.
Comparatively, unlike China, the United States does not categor-
ically bar the use of class actions in securities fraud suits123 in the
way that the Supreme People's Court precluded at least some repre-
sentative actions. Nor are U.S. courts able to avoid hearing class
actions by refusing to certify classes that meet the minimum certifi-
cation standards simply because the litigation may be time
consuming for the court. That is not to say, however, that courts are
entirely agnostic when it comes to class actions. Some scholars have
argued that U.S. courts not only are hostile to class actions but par-
ticularly hostile to class actions brought to allege violations of the
securities laws. 124 Even if this is true, institutional barriers are sub-
stantially lower in the United States.
3. Procedural and Related Barriers to Class Actions
Across the world, procedural rules governing class actions differ
on such factors as designation of attorneys and representative par-
ties; when comparing the approaches of China and the United
States, such differences become apparent since practices governing
the designation of a lead plaintiff and selection of lead attorneys
123. See Stephen B. Burbank, International Civil Litigation in U.S. Courts: Becoming a Paper
Tiger?, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 663, 666 (2012) ("One of the foundational assumptions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that the same rules apply in every type of case-they are
trans-substantive.").
124. See id. ("A majority of the [Morrison] Court was... signaling hostility to class actions
that is not confined to securities laws."); Roslyn Falk, May a Shareholder Who Objects to a Pro-
posed Settlement of a Derivative Action Appeal an Adverse Decision? A Report on California Public
Employees' Retirement System v. Felzen, 25 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 235, 246 (2000) ("[F]ederal
courts have seemed extremely hostile to class actions generally, and to securities class actions
especially."); Mark Klock, What Will It Take to Label Participation in a Deceptive Scheme to Deftaud
Buyers of Securities a Violation of Section 10(b)? The Disastrous Result and Reasoning ofStoneridge,
58 U. KAN. L. REv. 309, 323 (2010) ("[T]he securities bar knew in advance of the Court's
hostility towards investor class actions against corporations."). But see Pritchard, supra note 17,
at 140 ("The SEC's efforts to throw the plaintiffs under the bus were to no avail. The Court
rejected not only the plaintiffs' claim, but also the government's argument that private ac-
tions should be held to a higher standard.").
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vary between the United States and China. As discussed above, in
China, the representative plaintiffs and lawyers are selected by the
victim investors as a group. In the United States, courts designate
lead plaintiffs in securities law class actions, typically the willing
plaintiff with the largest alleged financial loss. The lead plaintiff
then selects counsel for the class. 125 Another difference is that attor-
neys in China now are prohibited from receiving contingency fees
in any class actions, which also raises the barriers to such suits be-
cause fewer attorneys will be willing to pursue them.
126
A procedural barrier to securities fraud class actions in China is
the requirement that there be an administrative or criminal ruling
of liability before the filing of a misrepresentation claim involving
securities. 127 As a result, the CSRC plays a gatekeeping role to pri-
vate litigation not played by the U.S. SEC. In the United States, no
private right of action exists for a few types of securities cases, such
as those alleging an aiding and abetting violation of Section 10(b),
even though the SEC does have the power to bring those cases.'2 8
That is very different, however, from leaving private plaintiffs de-
pendent on the SEC to bring an enforcement action in all cases of
securities fraud, as would be the equivalent of the regulatory ap-
proach in China. It has long been argued that one of the benefits of
private rights of action in the United States that extends particu-
larly to class actions is the additional deterrent effect that results
when issuers face potential fraud claims by investors since resource
constraints and, arguably, political constraints, limit the enforce-
ment abilities of regulators.
12 9
In sum, although the CPL's provisions for joint and representa-
tive actions facially extend to securities fraud suits, numerous
formal and informal mechanisms severely circumscribe the rights
of investors to bring class action claims alleging securities fraud in
125. SeeJames L. Tuxbury, Note, A Case for Competitive Bidding for Lead Counsel in Securities
Class Actions, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 285, 293. Although this sounds like a simple process,
that is far from the case. See, e.g.,John C. Coffee,Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountabil-
ity Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 288, 310-11 (2010) (discussing the pattern of institutional
investors opting out of securities class actions on the advice of their attorneys). The patterns
in and incentives associated with the selection and payment of legal counsel is largely beyond
the scope of this Article.
126. See HARvARD LAw SCH., THE LEGAL PROFESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 5
(2011), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/plp/pdf/Chinese-LegalProfes-
sion.pdf.
127. See supra text accompanying note 54. Investors have limited abilities to pursue crimi-
nal cases where the government refuses to do so, but there is no similar right if the CSRC
refises to pursue a complaint. See Li & Ong, supra note 42, at 707-08.
128. See Franco, supra note 34, at 50.
129. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARiz. L.
REv. 533, 552-53 (1997).
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China. It appears that representative actions were not available
before the 2012 CPL amendments. Furthermore, even where other-
wise permitted, acceptance of class actions is at the discretion of the
courts, which have powerful incentives to limit such suits. In con-
trast, securities fraud class actions are widely used in the United
States, though those rights were limited by the Supreme Court's
decision in Morrison in cases involving transnational factors.
B. Effects of the Recent CPL Amendments on Comparative Barriers to
Securities Class Actions
As explained above, the recent amendments to the CPL that pro-
vide for a public interest model of class actions were motivated by
concern that the current procedural mechanisms do not deter
and/or compensate for harms where the effects of the harms are
spread over large numbers of people.' 30 Rather than rely on injured
individuals to bring claims, as in the U.S. class action system, the
revised CPL also permits related organizations to act as intermedi-
ary plaintiffs.131 This representational model is not unique.
Taiwan's securities law, for example, designates a statutorily created
not-for-profit organization, The Securities and Futures Investors
Protection Center (IPC), as the entity with authority to bring civil
actions on behalf of investors.' 32 Investors must opt in to cases
brought by the IPC, each case must consist of a minimum of twenty
investors who opted-in, and any damages collected in the litigation
are dispersed to those investors.' 33
Also as noted above, one Chinese official, when supporting an
earlier version of the public interest amendments to the CPL, cited
the powers of China's SOA as being similar to those proposed in
the amendments and as evidence that such an approach is effective.
The SOA, however, provides a poor blueprint for public interest
legislation intended to fulfill a role similar to that of U.S.-style class
actions. The authority vested in the SOA has even less of a compen-
satory effect than enforcement actions brought by the U.S. SEC,
where provisions may be made for investor compensation. 34 When
the SOA sues for environmental damage, the plaintiff in the litiga-
tion is the state instead of the individual victims of the ocean
130. See supra Part II.D.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
132. Wang &Jian-Lin, supra note 41, at 143-45.
133. Id. at 146-47.
134. See Rose, supra note 17, at 1360 (noting the ability of the SEC to recover on behalf of
investors through the Fair Funds program).
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pollution, for example. 135 Thus, public interest legislation as con-
figured in countries like Taiwan differs from the SOA powers on
two dimensions. In the authors' view, first, unlike what would occur
in the public interest model of class actions, even if the SOA brings
suit, individual victims retain the right to engage a law firm to bring
a class action against the polluters as tortfeasors.13 6 The grant of
authority to the SOA does not deprive individuals of any legal
rights. The grant merely authorizes the SOA to take action to pro-
tect the state without speaking to the rights of individuals who
suffer damages as a result of the pollution. Second, the purpose of
the grant of authority to the SOA is to address damage suffered by
the state. As such, it is not an ideal model for legislation designed to
effectuate the rights of classes of individuals who have suffered
harm in situations such as those resulting from pollution, unsafe
food, or securities fraud. Thus, the litigation rights of the SOA in
no sense substitute for the compensatory elements of class actions
since there is no individual beneficiary except for the state, and the
state will not distribute the compensation it receives to members of
the public.
1 37
The litigation that resulted from the oil leaks of ConocoPhillips
in North China's Bohai Bay in 2011 illustrates the shortcomings of
the authority held by the SOA. Oil slicks from the ongoing leaks by
ConocoPhillips eventually covered about 1,200 square kilometers of
Bohai Bay. 138 ConocoPhillips settled for approximately 1.8 billion
yuan ($297 million), 1 billion of which appears to have been desig-
nated to improve fishery resources in the bay.1 39 However, some of
the affected fishermen were not satisfied with that settlement.140 In
135. See, e.g., Xiao, supra note 96 (noting that the "SOA declared that it would sue Co-
nocoPhillips China for ecological compensation").
136. SeeYinan, supra note 98.
137. This is not to say, however, that the state should not have a cause of action in circum-
stances where there was harm to the state. Instead, it is simply important to note that the
interests of the state may not entirely coincide with the interests of harmed individuals,
meaning redress of the harms to the state frequently will not result in redress to those indi-
viduals. This remains true when moving away from pollution and comparing interests and
damages to the state from securities fraud with the interests of and losses suffered by
shareholders.
138. SeeJonathan Watts, ConocoPhillips Slow to Clear Up Oil Spill in China's Bohai Sea, THE
GuARDN (Aug. 9, 2011, 12:37 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/aug/
09/conocophillips-oil-spill-china.
139. See Kenneth Rapoza, ConocoPhillips Pays Up $297 Mln for China Oil Spil, FORBES (Apr.
30, 2012, 10:24 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/04/30/conocophillips-
pays-up-297-mln-for-china-oil-spill/.
140. SeeYinan, supra note 98 (citing the fishermen's lawyer as saying "some of his clients
do not agree with the compensation").
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commenting on the 2012 CPL Draft, Zhao Jingwei, a lawyer repre-
senting some of the fishermen, stated that the effect of only
permitting those authorized by law to bring class actions would be
to make "the possibility of filing a public-interest case small. '"1 41 Sim-
ilarly, Professor Tang Weijian criticized the proposed section as
being "short on details and fail [ing] to consider academic research
and legal practice in class-action suits."142 Although the legislation
as enacted permits a broader range of entities to bring representa-
tive litigation, details remain subject to interpretation and
development.
1 43
The use of intermediaries in class action litigation, as is done by
Taiwan and as authorized by China in the 2012 CPL revision, is
more restrictive than the entrepreneurial approach of the United
States that permits investors to be represented in class litigation by
private-sector counsel whom they had a voice in choosing. One
topic of the academic debate over the U.S. approach to class ac-
tions, particularly in the securities law context, is the extent to
which permitting plaintiffs' attorneys to compete increases agency
costs at the expense of shareholder compensation and fails to result
in optimal levels of fraud deterrence. 44 Here, we compare the U.S.
system of allowing shareholders a role in the selection of private
sector class attorneys with the decision in China to rely on in-
termediaries to represent shareholders in securities law class
actions.
One concern with the intermediary approach is that the in-
termediaries necessarily have some interests that diverge from those
of the investors, and the litigation may be affected by that self-inter-
est.1 45 The concerns are heightened when the number of
intermediaries qualified to bring actions is limited in a significant
way. The 2012 amendments to the CPL restrict those who can bring
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 101-07.
144. See supra text accompany notes 14-15 (noting the debate about the compensatory
and deterrent effect of U.S. class actions). Compare Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Explod-
ing the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L.
REv. 103, 147-51, 155-62 (2006) (discussing the allocation of responsibility among lawyers in
class action cases and arguing the approach provides substantial deterrence), with John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the
Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 877, 896-917 (1987) (arguing that the conflicts of inter-
est between class attorneys and their clients result in substantial agency costs).
145. See, e.g., Wang &Jian-Lin, supra note 41, at 148 ("[B]ureaucratic members are driven
by their own self-interest and may fail to produce the optimal amount of public goods.").
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representative litigation to "related organizations."'146 This limita-
tion on the potential intermediaries increases the monopoly power
of allowed intermediaries.
Such monopoly power does have some virtues. One of the major
advantages is that, as Professors Liu and Xu argue, it is likely that
some of the social organizations empowered to act as in-
termediaries in China would be organizations that are financially
and politically supported by the government. As a result, their
profit maximization motivation would be moderated, thereby ad-
dressing a frequent criticism of plaintiffs' attorneys in the U.S.
entrepreneurial system. In addition, the financial resources that au-
thorities and social organizations could potentially bring to the
actions may be greater than those of some U.S. class action attor-
neys. And, if the authorities and social organizations are funded in
ways other than through fees charged to clients, 100 percent of any
recoveries could be used to compensate injured investors.
As noted above, it is expected that regulation and court practice
will be necessary to define which related organizations will be per-
mitted to bring representative actions under the revised CPL.
147
One entity that may become important in representative actions is
the China Securities Investor Protection Fund Corporation (SIPF),
which was established in 2005 by the CSRC 1 48 Originally, the SIPF,
which was funded with substantial capital, was to serve as a sort of
insurance fund for investors to provide protection from failures of
securities companies. 149 However, given the revisions to the CPL,
the SIPF could assume a role similar to that played by the IPC in
Taiwan. 5
0
From the opposite perspective, the approach taken in the revised
CPL that restricts the right to bring representative actions to enti-
ties that meet the definition of related organizations results in some
potential disadvantages due to the monopoly power of those in-
termediaries. At least in theory, the entrepreneurial nature of U.S.
class actions should benefit from competition in the legal services
market such that firms are forced to render quality legal services at
competitive contingency fees. This would be a greater disadvantage
146. See supra text accompanying notes 101-05.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 101-07.
148. Corporate Profile, CHINA SEC. INVESTOR PROTECTION FUND CORP. LIMITED (Mar. 29,
2011, 9:55:48 AM), http://www.sipf.com.cn/NewEN/aboutsipf/corporateprofile/03/40081.
shtml.
149. See Chenxia Shi, Protecting Investors in China Through Multiple Regulatoty Mechanisms
and Effective Enforcement, 24 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 451, 484 (2007).
150. See supra text accompanying note 132-33 (discussing the IPC).
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of the use of intermediaries if there were not such substantial evi-
dence of serious dysfunctions in the U.S. system of class counsel. 15'
Regardless of one's views on the inefficiencies of the U.S. approach,
an issue remains regarding the source of compensation for whoever
litigates a class action. If, as seems likely after the recent Chinese
reform, some of the intermediaries rely on government resources
to finance litigation on behalf of injured investors, it arguably is
unfair for taxpayers to subsidize litigation from which only a limited
subset of them directly benefit. Where the state is a long-term
owner in the defendant securities issuer, not only do the taxpayers
bear the cost of the litigation process, they also may bear a portion
of the cost of any damages award. On the other hand, if the injured
investors compensate the intermediaries, either the investors will
not be made whole for their losses or the judgments will have to be
calculated to include both losses and litigation costs. Either way, the
monopoly power of the authorities and social organizations may re-
sult in agency costs that are then borne by some combination of
injured investors, issuers, a subset of their shareholders, and society.
In sum, large-scale representative securities fraud actions effec-
tively are not available in China because of judicial and
administrative barriers in addition to the procedural barriers im-
posed by the CPL. The 2012 amendments to the CPL will permit
representative actions by a somewhat vaguely defined set of related
organizations, but the extent to which representative actions will be
effective in clearing the judicial and administrative barriers in situa-
tions of securities fraud is yet to be tested. Comparatively, the
judicial, administrative, and procedural barriers to such actions in
the United States by U.S. investors against U.S. companies are low.
Jurisprudence continues to develop on the extent to which securi-
ties fraud plaintiffs must prove various elements of a Section 10(b)
case at the class certification stage.152 However, the continued ro-
bustness of securities fraud class actions is evidenced by the
substantial annual settlements and judgments that result from those
suits.
15 3
151. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions:
Why "Exit" Works Better than "Voice, "30 CARDozo L. REv. 407, 407-08 (2008) (arguing opt-outs
can increase competition and decrease agency costs in class action litigation); Howard M.
Erichson, CAFA's Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1593, 1596-602 (2008)
(discussing mistrust of class action lawyers); Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. L.
REv. 377, 384-89 (2011) (discussing agency costs associated with defense of class actions).
152. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
153. See MILEv ET AL., supra note 111, at 3, 15, 17-18.
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IV. TRANSNATIONAL APPLICATION OF SECTION 10(B) IN PRIVATE
RIGHTS OF ACTION-A MODEST PROPOSAL
As the United States considers the extent to which private actions
alleging violations of Section 10(b) should be permitted in contexts
that involve non-U.S. plaintiffs, defendants, securities transactions,
or activities, one of the oft-referenced policy considerations is inter-
national comity. 154 This Article has delved into the use of class
actions in China and the United States in order to facilitate this
Part's recommendation for an amendment to the '34 Act. The Part
begins, however, by considering how the comparative analysis of se-
curities fraud actions in the United States and China would change
if either the Fox Proposal or one of the Conduct and Effects Pro-
posals are adopted. It then outlines our proposal for statutory
change. The Part concludes by framing the application of our pro-
posal through discussion of a post-Morrison case.
A. Comparative Effects of Adoption of the Fox Proposal or Conduct and
Effects Proposals
The Fox Proposal is elegant in its simplicity. 15 5 Elimination of all
U.S. securities fraud class actions against non-U.S. companies, as
Professor Fox advocates, would avoid the ambiguities associated
with the Morrison test. For example, defining when a transaction
occurs in the United States is challenging. 56 The sole exception
under Professor Fox's approach would permit Section 10(b) claims
against those non-U.S. companies that choose to be subject to Sec-
tion 10(b). 157 That standard would be administratively convenient
and make the outcomes predictable.
From the perspective of international comity, the Fox Proposal
defers entirely to a company's home country to provide any access
to securities class actions unless a particular company elects to be
subject to the U.S. regime. There is no involuntary intrusion of U.S.
law into a foreign jurisdiction. If one accepts Professor Fox's as-
sumptions that securities markets are efficient, class actions fail to
provide substantial compensation to anyone other than attorneys
154. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Ausfl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887 (2010) ("The Solici-
tor General points out that the 'significant and material conduct' test is in accord with
prevailing notions of international comity.").
155. See Fox, supra note 7, at 1176-82 (setting forth a reform proposal to address post-
Morrison issues).
156. See SEC STUDY, supra note 8, at 33-35.
157. See Fox, supra note 7, at 1179.
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for the class, and unsophisticated investors should be protected
through means other than securities fraud class actions, then there
is much to be said for this proposal.
The Fox Proposal, though, requires careful evaluation. The most
significant concerns are associated either with the Fox Proposal's
economic efficiency assumptions or with its reliance on alternate
mechanisms to address efficiency lapses. One thread running
through the Fox Proposal is the argument that U.S. markets will not
be internationally competitive if non-U.S. companies are involunta-
rily subjected to U.S. securities fraud class action suits. However,
though non-U.S. companies may articulate concerns with the po-
tential liability associated with those suits, 158 data indicate that the
U.S. financial markets do not reflect such a negative view of the
liability. For example, one study found that the securities prices of
foreign companies listed in the United States did not change signif-
icantly in reaction to either the Morrison decision or the oral
arguments to the Supreme Court, when the Court's skepticism of
the conduct and effects test was apparent. 159 If, in fact, markets are
efficient and the potential liability effect of U.S. securities fraud
class actions was significant, one would have expected securities
prices of non-U.S. issuers to increase in reaction to the decision or
oral arguments.
Further, if the efficiency assumptions underlying the Fox Propo-
sal accurately predict firm behavior, then one result may be for U.S.
companies to move outside the United States. Consider the propo-
sal's argument that permitting foreign companies to register in the
United States without being automatically subject to U.S. securities
fraud class actions would increase the attractiveness of the U.S. cap-
ital markets to those companies. 60 Application of the same analysis
and assumptions to U.S. public companies, which would remain
subject to securities fraud class actions, means they would have a
higher cost of capital, making them less competitive. 161 The result-
ing incentive would be for U.S. public companies to establish their
primary locus outside of the United States in order to avoid being
subject to U.S. securities fraud class actions, making this a troubling
158. See id. at 1178 & n.9.
159. See SEC STUDY, supra note 8, app. B, at B8.
160. Cf Fox, supra note 7, at 1269 (discussing concern that U.S. capital markets are un-
competitive in part because of the costs associated with class action fraud lawsuits).
161. Professor Fox acknowledges the potential costs on U.S. issuers but suggests revisiting
the issues with the liability framework another day. See id. at 1270.
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course for U.S. policymakers to take in the current economic
climate. 162
The Fox Proposal also takes minimal account of the SEC's inves-
tor protection mandate and only marginally recognizes the fact that
a robust anti-fraud regime is important to unsophisticated, undiver-
sified investors. Professor Fox suggests that investor education,
enhanced broker disclosures, and reductions in the proportion of
employer stock that individuals are permitted to hold in their re-
tirement accounts would provide sufficient protection to those
investors. 163 The suggestion ignores the literature showing that
many people are uninterested in making financial decisions and
that investor education is ineffective. t64 Research studies show that
increasing the disclosure obligations associated with financial ad-
vice may result in investors receiving even worse advice. 65 Finally,
the problem of lack of diversification in retirement accounts goes
far beyond the overinvestment in employer stock that Professor Fox
acknowledges but argues should be dealt with through other regu-
lation.1 66  In sum, it is unlikely that the issues faced by
unsophisticated investors can be sufficiently addressed through ed-
ucation, disclosure, and direct regulation of investment allocations
in retirement accounts.
The Conduct and Effects Proposals are more complex than the
Fox Proposal, relying on fact-intensive evaluations of when suffi-
cient conduct occurs in the United States and the types of effects
that establish adequate U.S. interests. The Supreme Court dis-
cussed the extensive critiques of the prior test by scholars, which
predated Morrison and continue. 167 The criticisms include the intru-
sion of U.S. securities law into the markets of other countries, the
162. For a company to move its locus outside the United States could be less difficult than
some might guess; some U.S. companies have established "co-headquarters" outside the
United States. See Tom Kucharvy, The Payoffs of Cisco's Globalization Odyssey, BEYOND IT (Jan.
31, 2010), http://beyond-it-inc.com/GKEblog/the-payoffs-of-cisco%E2%80%99s-globaliza-
tion-odyssey.html.
163. See Fox, supra note 7, at 1198.
164. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 111-12 (2008) (describing
the net effect of investor education as increasing performance on a true/false test from 54
percent to 55 percent).
165. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, Moral Equilibrium: Stock Brokers and the Limits of Disclosure,
2011 Wis. L. REV. 1059, 1100-02 (2011).
166. See JACK VANDERHEI, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., THE IMPACT OF THE RECENT FINAN-
CALL CRIsIs ON 401(K) ACCOUNT BALANCES (2009) at 3, 11, available at http://www.ebri.org/
pdf/briefspdf/EBRI IB 2-2009_Crisis-Impct.pdf (highlighting the danger during the finan-
cial crisis to employees' with investment allocations concentrated in high risk assets).
167. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2880-81 (2010).
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
unpredictability of the tests, and the burden on U.S. judicial
resources. 168
B. Proposal for Legislative Reform
We propose a modest and clear expansion of the right of private
plaintiffs to bring Section 10(b) suits in cases involving transna-
tional factors. The proposal is a simple one-that U.S. investors be
permitted to bring securities law class actions against companies
whose securities, including ADRs, trade on U.S. exchanges regard-
less of where those investors entered into the relevant securities
transactions. Our proposal would not modify any other rights of
action that arise from the application of the Morrison test.
We recognize that our proposal draws two clear lines that have
not in the past existed in the Section 10(b) jurisprudence. First, it
would provide additional rights of action for certain shareholders
of public companies that trade on a U.S. exchange, thus explicitly
distinguishing between the rights of shareholders in public compa-
nies as compared to nonpublic companies. Second, our proposal
focuses the protective aspects of Section 10(b) on U.S. investors,
thus distinguishing among a company's shareholders.
Our decision not to recommend extension of rights of action re-
garding the securities of companies that do not trade on a U.S.
exchange both recognizes the policy judgment reflected in the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) 169 legislation and
addresses the effect of the JOBS Act on the access of non-U.S. com-
panies to U.S. exchanges. The JOBS Act increases the ability of
non-public companies to raise capital from wealthy individuals with-
out being subject to the disclosure obligations imposed on public
companies.1 70 This provides flexibility for small businesses in acces-
sing capital. Under our proposal, small foreign companies, or even
large foreign companies that choose to forgo the benefits of trad-
ing on a U.S. exchange, would be protected from securities fraud
claims brought by investors, though the SEC would retain authority
to enforce Section 10(b) against those entities.
Our recommendation, however, responds to the increased threat
after the JOBS Act of fraud by foreign companies that list on U.S.
168. See, e.g., SEC STuDY, supra note 8, at 53-55.
169. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
170. Cf JenniferJ. Johnson, Feecing Grandma: A Regulatoy Ponzi Scheme, 16 LEWIS& CLARK
L. REv. 993, 1011-12 (2012) (discussing the removal of the ban on general solicitation in
private placements directed at accredited investors).
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exchanges and obtain capital from U.S. investors via U.S. and for-
eign transactions. Consider, for example, the potential future
effects if Chinese companies rely on a JOBS Act provision that has
become known as the IPO on-ramp. The IPO on-ramp permits
companies, including non-U.S. companies, that become public in
the United States after December 9, 2012 to elect lower levels, as
compared to established public companies, of auditor engagement
and reporting for up to five years. 171 A technique that pre-dated the
JOBS Act and was used by more than 150 Chinese companies to
access the U.S. capital markets between January 2007 and March
2010 is known as a reverse merger.172 The structure of a reverse
merger is somewhat complex, but the point is that the technique
permits companies to avoid the typical lengthy IPO process. That
process includes scrutiny of the company by underwriters and re-
view by the SEC of the company's registration statement including
audited financial statements.1 73 Recently, significant numbers of the
Chinese companies that had utilized the reverse merger technique
have faced securities fraud class actions, typically for inaccurate dis-
closures related to financial results. 74 As discussed above, this
constituted an increase in U.S. class actions filed against Chinese
companies.
1 75
Chinese companies' use of techniques to access the U.S. public
capital markets, while reducing to the extent possible scrutiny and
reporting, may become an increased threat to U.S. investors as
China's internal securities markets grow and become more open to
foreign investors. Under the rule established in Morrison, U.S. inves-
tors who buy securities of Chinese companies on a U.S. exchange
or in a U.S. transaction are permitted to bring class actions under
Section 10(b). However, if those shareholders purchase shares in
the same companies on a Chinese exchange, they are precluded by
Morrison from bringing an action in the United States regarding
those shares. We have seen that it is also unlikely they will be able to
bring a representative action in China.1 76 We discuss below the ex-
tent to which certain investment strategies by U.S. investors may
result in purchases on foreign exchanges.1
77
171. SeeJOBS Act §§ 101-04.
172. Jan Jindra et al., Reverse Mergers: The Chinese Experience 8 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Work-
ing Paper No. 2012-03-018, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfnm?
abstractjid=2105814. By comparison, fifty-six Chinese companies conducted traditional IPOs
during the time period. Id.
173. See id. at 7.
174. See id. at 10-11.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 110-12.
176. See supra Part III.
177. See infra text accompanying notes 189-92.
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Although our proposal reflects deep concern with the need to
protect the integrity of the U.S. exchanges, it aligns with the princi-
ple long reflected in the securities acts, and which continues in the
JOBS Act, that certain categories of investors, such as accredited
investors, require less regulatory protection. Thus, we limit our sug-
gested extension of rights of action to shareholders in companies
that trade on the U.S. public markets. Similarly, that limitation per-
mits non-U.S. companies to decide whether to be subject to
securities fraud class actions because companies must take explicit
actions for their securities to trade on a U.S. exchange.
At least two other commentators recommended, prior to Morri-
son, that U.S. securities class actions be limited to plaintiffs who
purchased their shares in U.S. transactions. 178 Our proposal is both
more and less inclusive than those proposals. Acknowledging the
many reasons why transactions may be executed on various ex-
changes, as discussed in the next two sections, our proposal would
permit U.S. investors to bring securities fraud class actions that re-
late to all securities of a company with shares traded on a U.S.
exchange. Our proposal is intentionally more limited than those
proposals that focus primarily on the locus of a transaction in order
to extend securities fraud protections to any investor who trades in
a U.S.-based transaction. In addition to the increasing difficulties in
determining when a non-exchange based transaction is located in
the United States, we are concerned, as discussed below, with re-
spect for international comity. Thus, we do not advocate extending
any additional rights beyond those that exist under Morrison to non-
U.S. investors.
C. Application of Proposed Reform
One post-Morrison case involving U.S. investors that would have
come out differently under our proposal is Stackhouse v. Toyota Mo-
tor Co. 179 The Stackhouse order at issue addressed the appointment of
a lead plaintiff and, thus, required consideration of the scope of the
178. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Manag-
ing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14, 68 (2007) (advocating limitation of
claims to those "arising out of transactions on U.S. markets");John C. Coffee, Jr., Global Class
Actions, NAT'L. L.J.,June 11, 2007, at 12 ("U.S. courts should certify only a class of individuals,
both foreign and domestic, who purchased on U.S. markets.").
179. Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. CV 10-0922 DSF (AJWx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79837 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010).
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losses a plaintiff could assert in a Section 10(b) claim.8 0 Toyota Mo-
tor Company's common stock trades in its home country of Japan
on the Tokyo stock exchange, and its American Depository Shares
(ADS) 8 1 trade in the United States on the NYSE.' 8 2 In January
2010, Toyota announced a recall of over three million vehicles due
to problems involving throttle malfunctions that arguably led to un-
intended acceleration. Prior to that date, Toyota had publicly stated
that thousands of reports of unintended acceleration were attribu-
table to either driver error or incorrectly installed floor mats. After
the recall and related announcements, Toyota's stock price lost at
least 11 percent of its value, and shareholders brought Section
10(b) claims alleging Toyota's earlier statements constituted mate-
rial misstatements. 18 3 The Maryland State Retirement and Pension
System (MSRPS), the claimant holding the largest value in Toyota
ADSs, was appointed lead plaintiff. It, along with other plaintiffs,
was permitted to assert claims based on its purchases of the ADSs,
but, under the principles established in Morrison, the court indi-
cated they would be precluded from including in their claims any
shares purchased on the Tokyo exchange.
8 4
In their opinion concurring in the judgment in Morrison v. Na-
tional Australia Bank Ltd., Justices Stevens and Ginsburg anticipated
cases similar to Stackhouse.185 They posited the situation where a
company listed overseas defrauded a U.S. investor, but "it was in
New York City that the executives masterminded and implemented
a massive deception which artificially inflated the [company's]
stock price." 86 They argued that it would be an "oddity" not to pro-
tect U.S. investors in such a case and that the majority's ruling
narrowed the interpretation of Section 10(b) to an extent "that
would surprise and alarm generations of [U.S.] investors." 87 In the
view of Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, the conduct and effects test
would better serve U.S. interests by "strik[ing] a reasonable balance
180. See id. at *4-5.
181. American Depository Shares (ADS) are the trading shares of American Depository
Receipt (ADR) programs, which enable the shares of foreign companies to trade on U.S.
exchanges. See Peter M. Friedman, Note, Risky Business: Can Faulty Country Risk Factors in the
Prospectuses of U.S. Listed Chinese Companies Raise Violations of U.S. Securities Law?, 44 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 241, 245 n.15 (2005).
182. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Remedies for Foreign Investors Under U.S. Federal Securities Law,
75 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 178 (2012).
183. See In re Toyota Motor Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV 10-922 DSF (AJWx), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 75732, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2011).
184. See Buxbaum, supra note 182, at 178.
185. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888-95 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
186. Id. at 2895.
187. Id.
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between the goals of 'preventing the export of fraud from
America,' protecting shareholders, enhancing investor confidence,
and deterring corporate misconduct, on the one hand, and con-
serving United States resources and limiting conflict with foreign
law, on the other."8
8
We do not go as far as Justices Stevens and Ginsburg would have
because of the legitimate concerns with the unpredictability of the
conducts and effects test and the scope of its potential application
to both private and public foreign companies that engage in activi-
ties in the United States or whose activities have effects in the
United States. However, under the approach we advocate, those
plaintiffs such as the MSRPS in Stackhouse, who were U.S. investors,
could have included in their claim all of the Toyota securities that
they had purchased during the class period.
In the absence of adoption of our proposal, sophisticated U.S.
investors, including pension funds such as MSRPS, whose invest-
ment strategies require large purchases of securities in
transnational companies, may find it costly, difficult, or impossible
to make all of their purchases in such a company on a U.S. ex-
change due to trading volume or limited numbers of ADSs. In that
situation, the U.S. investor is left with an unwelcome choice. One
possibility is for it to modify its preferred investment strategy and
restrict its purchases to the U.S. exchange, with the result that it
buys fewer shares. Alternatively, it could forego the protections of
Section 10(b) for some part of its portfolio and implement its in-
vestment strategy by making some purchases on a non-U.S.
exchange. If, as an example, the investor purchased shares of a Chi-
nese company on an exchange in China, it would face all of the
barriers discussed above to a class action securities fraud lawsuit.
8 9
These alternatives force the investor to compromise either its in-
vestment strategy or its ability to efficiently seek redress through a
single class action if a portfolio company engages in securities
fraud.
The question of where securities transactions will be executed
occurs in a variety of circumstances that are not necessarily obvious.
For example, sophisticated investors that wish to trade outside the
operating hours of the U.S. exchanges may face the quandary of
whether to trade on a foreign exchange and forego Section 10(b)
protections or to wait for the U.S. markets to open. And, even
where it is convenient for a U.S. investor to engage in transactions
188. Id. at 2893-94 (quoting Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 175 (2d
Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010)).
189. See supra Part III.
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on a U.S. exchange using ADSs, that strategy may be more expen-
sive, due to the fees assessed by ADS issuers, than if the investor had
conducted some of the transactions on a non-U.S. exchange. 190 In
those circumstances, the investor must add the comparison of trans-
action costs to the risk calculus of how best to pursue its strategy of
investing in non-U.S. companies.
Another problem with Morrison's exclusion of all securities not
purchased in the United States is that investors, particularly unso-
phisticated investors, may not discover until the time they are
denied the right to bring a Section 10(b) claim that a particular
transaction was executed on a foreign exchange. This may occur,
for example, because a broker-dealer, in accordance with its obliga-
tion of best execution, automatically executed a transaction on a
non-U.S. exchange. 191 Even if asked about any execution prefer-
ences, a retail customer may not express a preference for a U.S.
exchange simply because he or she did not know about or under-
stand the implications of Morrison for his or her future claims. We
are less sanguine than Professor Fox about the likelihood that in-
creased investor education would remedy this lack of
understanding.
Somewhat similarly, sophisticated investors may find that they
have no choice but to pursue costly individual securities litigation
in a foreign country. One commentator has noted that if an institu-
tional investor that owes fiduciary duties to its clients chooses to
purchase on foreign exchanges, then the investor could be left with
an obligation to pursue costly foreign litigation in order to vindi-
cate its client's interests. 192 For example, if an investment manager
for a pension fund to which it is a fiduciary purchases shares of a
Chinese company on a Chinese exchange for the account of the
pension fund, that investment manager may have an obligation to
pursue litigation on behalf of its client in China.
Our proposed amendment clarifies the application of Section
10(b) and its protections in these circumstances. It supports the
ability of U.S. investors to pursue their preferred trading strategies
in companies that choose to list on U.S. exchanges without losing
the protections of U.S. anti-fraud law. It avoids the trading costs
that would result from the alternative of using enhanced disclosures
to explain where each securities transaction is to be executed and
the necessary calculations of whether an additional cost of execu-
tion on a U.S. exchange is offset by the increased legal protections.
190. See SEC STUDY, supra note 8, at 45-47.
191. See id. at 43.
192. See id. at 47.
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The discussion above of the limited availability of representative se-
curities fraud actions in China provides an example of the
complexity of these calculations. In order to assess the potential
costs of securities fraud attached to shares purchased in China, an
investor not only would need to become familiar with the statutory
provisions in the CPL but also would have to understand the im-
plicit barriers associated with judicial incentives, political concerns,
and other hurdles discussed above.193 Furthermore, these assess-
ments would have to be undertaken on a continuing basis.
D. General Considerations Regarding Proposed Reform
We recognize that expanding the rights of U.S. investors to bring
Section 10(b) actions in cases involving non-U.S. companies will
not be universally acclaimed. We expect non-U.S. companies that
would be subject to increased liability to U.S. investors as a result of
a decision to list on a U.S. exchange to object, arguing that our
proposal will cause U.S. markets to be uncompetitive. They also
may contend that U.S. law would be unreasonably intrusive into se-
curities transactions executed outside the United States, with the
result being a lack of respect for international comity. In contrast,
foreign investors might object that our proposal would provide
them with too little protection because they would have fewer rights
of action than U.S. investors. This section addresses those
objections.
1. Competitiveness of U.S. Capital Markets
Concerns may be raised about the effect of our proposal on the
U.S. securities markets through its expansion of liability for compa-
nies listed in the United States. The world securities markets have
undergone rapid change in recent years, and exchanges must now
compete for listings. Thus, it is important to consider whether a
liability standard predicated in part on whether a foreign company
has publicly traded securities in the United States would decrease
the competitive position of U.S. exchanges. In addition to the nega-
tive impact on the U.S. markets, our proposal could result in costs
to U.S. investors. If fewer foreign firms listed in the United States,
our proposal would decrease, to some extent, the ability of U.S. in-
vestors to invest in those firms.
193. See supra Part III.
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Chinese companies provide a particularly good example of these
potential issues because, as noted above, there are currently still
limitations on the ability of both individual and institutional inves-
tors to purchase shares on China's exchanges. However, the history
of substantial numbers of foreign companies choosing to list on
U.S. exchanges undermines the argument that the threat of securi-
ties fraud class actions makes U.S. exchanges uncompetitive. The
conduct and effects test that was in effect prior to the Morrison deci-
sion permitted private rights of action to far more investors in far
more circumstances than we propose. We cannot know what the
U.S. public markets would have looked like in the absence of that
pre-Morrison liability, but, clearly, significant numbers of foreign
firms, including Chinese firms, determined that the additional li-
quidity and prestige of a U.S. listing more than offset the potential
Section 10(b) liability.19 4 As discussed above, for example, signifi-
cant numbers of Chinese companies have accessed the U.S. capital
markets in recent years. 195 The lack of any significant pricing effect
resulting from either the Morrison decision or the oral arguments to
the Supreme Court-when the Court's skepticism of the conduct
and effects test was apparent-also calls into question whether par-
ticipants in the U.S. capital markets view the liability risk associated
with securities fraud class actions as substantial.
96
As also noted above, Congress and the courts have imposed sub-
stantial limitations, in addition to those that resulted from Morrison,
on class actions and in particular on securities fraud class actions.
197
One commentator encapsulated his viewpoint on those changes in
his statement that "the need of foreign companies for protection
against litigation in U.S. courts is less today than it has been in de-
cades, in both absolute and comparative dimensions." 198 Our
proposal does not affect any of the limitations other than granting
U.S. investors the right to bring class action securities fraud cases
against non-U.S. companies that choose to list on U.S. exchanges
regardless of where the U.S. investors purchase or sell the compa-
nies' securities. At the same time, it would retain a more level
competitive playing field between non-U.S. and U.S. firms than the
Fox Proposal, which would competitively disadvantage U.S. firms.1 99
194. See SEC STuDY, supra note 8, at 66.
195. See supra text accompanying note 172.
196. See supra text accompanying note 159.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17.
198. Burbank, supra note 123, at 664.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 160-161.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
2. Comity and Differentiation Between U.S. and
Non-U.S. Investors
The concerns of foreign companies and governments about the
implications of our proposal for international comity, and the ob-
jection by non-U.S. investors that U.S. law would provide them with
fewer rights than received by U.S. investors, are dealt with together
in this subsection. One of the mechanisms used by our proposal to
moderate the effect of U.S. class actions on international comity is
to differentiate between U.S. and non-U.S. investors. Thus, our ra-
tionale for the differentiation addresses the comity concerns.
The potential strain on international comity if a U.S. law is too
broad in its authorization of causes of action for class action securi-
ties law claims in transnational situations is widely recognized. The
Supreme Court in Morrison acknowledged the issue of comity, citing
amicus briefs from some countries that argued for limited applica-
tion of Section 10(b). 200 The Solicitor General also was sensitive to
the issue, noting that its preferred test, which was narrower than
the conduct and effects test but broader than the test ultimately
adopted by the Morrison Court, was "in accord with prevailing no-
tions of international comity."201
International comity does not have a single definition. One
oft-cited early statement by the Supreme Court supplies two basic
considerations for comity: "having due regard ... to international
duty and convenience" 2 2 on the one hand and "to the rights of its
own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws" on the other.203 The second consideration accords with the
argument made against use of U.S. class actions in securities fraud
suits with transnational implications by some foreign governments,
namely that their legal systems permit appropriate actions by inves-
tors in cases of securities fraud.
20 4
Our study of China's class action securities fraud regime permits
us to test the argument that U.S. investors who buy securities of
Chinese companies in China have sufficient remedies under Chi-
nese law if they are defrauded. We certainly do not make the claim
that China provides no protection to U.S. investors against securi-
ties fraud.205 Our focus here is limited to the availability of class
200. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2885-86 (2010).
201. See id. at 2887.
202. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
203. Id.
204. See SEC STUY, supra note 8, at 55-56.
205. But see supra text accompanying notes 53-57 (discussing limitations of China's sys-
tem of securities regulation).
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actions. Our finding on that point, as discussed above, is that nu-
merous barriers, imposed explicitly by proclamations of the
Supreme People's Court2 6 or implicitly through incentives to the
lower courts and potential political considerations by government
enforcement bodies,20 7 limit the ability of investors to use class ac-
tions in instances of securities fraud. The 2012 amendments to the
CPL permit entities that qualify as related organizations to bring
representative actions.208 Professors Liu and Xu believe this may in-
crease the use of securities fraud class actions but will not address
many of the impediments to those actions discussed above. Al-
though our study is of only one country, China, it is a country that is
important in considering the protection of U.S. investors both be-
cause of the recent pattern of securities fraud among a number of
Chinese companies that have accessed the U.S. capital markets in
recent years and because it is not a question of if, but at what pace,
China's economic development and world economic influence will
continue to expand.
The second factor at issue in weighing international comity con-
cerns is "having due regard . . . to international duty and
convenience."20 9 In summary, in the authors' view, our study of
China's securities law regime for class actions provides a rich set of
explanations for why China has chosen to limit those actions.
210
When carefully considered from the perspective of comity, how-
ever, we find that the primary concerns with securities fraud actions
in China flow from the potential use of class actions by Chinese
citizens and have limited application to the rights of non-Chinese
citizens in actions brought outside China.211 Our proposal, which
does not extend the rule from Morrison with respect to the right of
non-U.S. investors to bring class actions, is sensitive to China's con-
cerns regarding the rights of its domestic investors, just as our
proposal is sensitive to the obligation of the United States to ensure
its laws appropriately protect U.S. investors.
One issue discussed in China regarding the use of collective ac-
tions in securities fraud cases is the potential of social unrest. By
limiting the extension of rights to U.S. investors, our proposal does
not risk empowering foreign investors in ways that their home
countries might find challenging. Our proposal does not grant for-
eign investors additional rights of action in the United States that
206. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
207. See supra Part III.A.2.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
209. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
210. See supra Parts III.A.2-3.
211. Id.
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might lead them to seek similar rights in their home jurisdiction,
nor does it risk providing them with any new source of action
against companies from their home country that they would not
have under local law. Our proposal also does not interfere with the
judicial administrative incentives established abroad. If anything,
our proposal should reduce the external pressure on countries
where investors have limited or no access to class actions to deviate
from their policy choices because U.S. shareholders would be per-
mitted to assert legal claims in the United States rather than having
to attempt to seek vindication of those claims either in the place
where they engage in securities transactions or in the home country
of the foreign company.
Another set of issues with the internal use of class actions in
China results from the Chinese government's ownership interest in
Chinese companies and includes the potential for wealth transfers
from the general populace to investors212 and the possibility of po-
litical considerations infiltrating the decision making of the
judiciary and government enforcement bodies.213 Our proposal mit-
igates these concerns by giving U.S. investors, and only U.S.
investors, a mechanism in the United States to pursue securities
fraud actions against non-U.S. companies, including Chinese com-
panies. Because those lawsuits would occur within the United
States, they entirely avoid China's concern about the potential for
political considerations to affect the proceedings of its domestic
courts and government enforcement bodies.
Our proposal admittedly permits U.S. fraud class actions to be
brought in the United States against Chinese companies with gov-
ernment ownership. The result of fraud awards or settlements may
result in some transfer of wealth from the Chinese state to U.S. in-
vestors. But, to the extent a company with government ownership
chooses to list on a U.S. exchange, the company, and impliedly its
shareholders, would be willingly assuming the risk of securities
fraud suits brought by U.S. investors based on securities transac-
tions by those investors anywhere in the world in exchange for the
possibility of direct access to the U.S. public capital markets. In bal-
ancing the comity concern of intrusion of U.S. fraud law into
China's domestic affairs with the obligation of the United States to
protect U.S. investors, this compromise holds the state equally re-
sponsible for securities fraud from a financial standpoint as it holds
any other shareholder. But, because it does not expand the rights
212. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18, 122.
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of non-U.S. investors, our proposal does not increase the risk of
intra-country transfers of wealth between shareholders and society.
A final Chinese concern regarding class actions generally, and
securities fraud class actions specifically, is whether the judicial sys-
tem and securities markets are sufficiently mature for large,
complex class actions.21 4 Our proposal does not implicate this con-
cern at all because we advocate only an extension of rights under
U.S. law involving lawsuits within the United States. In fact, it argua-
bly would reduce the burden on Chinese courts because, if given a
choice, one would expect U.S. shareholders to choose to litigate
securities fraud claims against Chinese companies in the United
States rather than in China.
CONCLUSION
The use of class action lawsuits continues to be the subject of
much debate in the academic and policy communities throughout
the world. Although the debates about class actions are to some
extent agnostic across doctrinal boundaries, this Article focuses on
the use of class actions in cases involving transnational securities
fraud. In light of the globalization of the securities markets and
China's increasing economic power, the Article investigates China's
approach to class actions. It finds that administrative incentives and
authoritative statements by the Supreme People's Court more heav-
ily circumscribe the use of securities fraud class actions than would
be apparent from comparing Rule 23 with the equivalent provisions
in the Chinese civil procedure code.
The rejection of U.S.-style class actions by a burgeoning eco-
nomic power with a rapidly developing system of securities markets
arguably affirms the validity of the Supreme Court majority's con-
cern, expressed in its decision in Morrison, with international
comity. However, the balance of interests between the United States
and China, or between the United States and any other country,
depends on a complex set of considerations that in the case of U.S.
securities law should include the protection of U.S. investors and
trading markets and deterrence of those who might cause the
United States to "become the Barbary Coast for those perpetrating
frauds on foreign securities markets. '" 21 5 After analyzing the effects
of the Morrison decision and considering various proposals in-
tended to address those effects, we make the simple, limited
214. See supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
215. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010).
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proposal that the '34 Act be amended to authorize U.S. investors to
bring Section 10(b) class actions against non-U.S. companies whose
securities are traded on a U.S. exchange regardless of where those
investors entered into the relevant securities transactions.
